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A list of ten “forbidden” behaviors posted to (and then deleted from) the public WeChat account of China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) in Beijing seemed to reveal discontent with strict pandemic controls among the country’s future diplomats. The list detailed the rigid restrictions imposed on students and the attempt to stop them from engaging in “inappropriate speech that distorts or negates government pandemic control policy.”

Students across China have rebelled against similar controls. At Shanghai’s prestigious Tongji University, students engaged in a protest art movement in opposition to a campus lockdown, with some students adopting a meme critical of foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s assertion that they should be happy to be living in China during the pandemic. At Peking University, students demanded administrators “tear down the wall” that was preventing them from leaving campus (while allowing teachers and staff to come and go as they pleased).

Life for Chinese diplomats is often quite restrictive, even in non-pandemic times. In Peter Martin’s book on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he noted that the common practice of “doubling,” whereby diplomats are supervised by at least one colleague on all their sojourns, saw one diplomat accompanied by four minders on his first date. The pandemic restrictions at CFAU are quite possibly more onerous: students need permission for any movement, even between villages, and are banned from purchasing overseas goods due to the government’s persistent (and unproven) assertion that COVID can be traced to packages arriving from overseas.

CDT has translated China Foreign Affairs University’s “Ten Forbiddens” in full: 

1. It is forbidden to ignore or fail to abide by pandemic prevention work requirements as implemented by higher-ups or school administrators; to ignore orders or breach quarantine; to respond to pandemic prevention measures in a perfunctory, deceptive, or disobedient manner; or to treat pandemic prevention measures as a mere formality.
   

2. It is forbidden to conceal, lie, delay, omit, fabricate, or falsify information when reporting your or your co-residents’ travel history, recent contacts, health status, or other pandemic control-related information. It is forbidden to refuse pandemic-related measures including contact tracing, monitoring, quarantine, or observation.
   

3. In the absence of prior authorization, it is forbidden to post, republish, or share nonpublic pandemic control information on Wechat (WeChat groups or WeChat moments), Weibo, QQ, Douyin, Kuaishou, BiliBili, or on other websites, social media platforms, or social media groups. It is likewise forbidden to fabricate, propagate, or disseminate, in any form, false or unconfirmed pandemic-related information, or to engage in inappropriate speech that distorts or negates government pandemic control policy.
   

4. It is forbidden to violate pandemic prevention requirements by organizing or attending group dinners, parties, or similar gatherings. It is forbidden to organize or attend unauthorized large-scale gatherings. Minimize the use of public transportation and participation in off-campus activities. Do not enter bars, internet cafés, karaoke parlors, “scripted murder” gaming rooms, card rooms, public swimming pools, saunas, steam rooms, hot springs, or other crowded places.
   

5. It is forbidden to leave at-home isolation or quarantine without prior permission or before the period of observation or quarantine has elapsed.
   

6. It is forbidden to leave or enter the school campus, leave or return to Beijing, leave the country, or cross border zones (this includes provincial, city, county, town, and village borders) without prior authorization. Travel to medium- or high-risk areas is forbidden.
   

7. It is forbidden to borrow or appropriate other people’s student IDs, health codes, or travel itineraries, or to refuse to submit to inspections of this documentation.
   

8. It is forbidden to buy overseas goods. Continue to avoid purchasing items from overseas or receiving international packages, and minimize the use of any delivery services.

9. It is forbidden to give personal interviews (including phone interviews) to domestic or foreign news outlets without prior authorization. It is forbidden to privately share information or tips with the media, or to submit manuscripts, give interviews, or spread irresponsible remarks to the media.

10. It is forbidden to obstruct local cadres, medical workers, volunteers, or other pandemic-prevention personnel from carrying out their duties. Any other behavior that impedes pandemic-prevention work or violates pandemic-prevention regulations is forbidden. [Chinese]
    

The Chinese government has been courting the Global South to advance its image as a responsible guarantor of international security and development. Last week, China took the initiative by hosting the first China-Horn of Africa conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, followed by the 14th BRICS summit in Beijing. The resulting joint-statements praised Xi Jinping’s new Global Security Initiative (GSI) and sought to rally states around non-Western approaches to international affairs, despite producing little substantive action. However, in a bid to reinforce public traction for Beijing’s leadership, Chinese state media content has made its way into local media coverage of these conferences, demonstrating that media continues to be an important vessel for China’s global ambitions. 

Describing the “international political signalling” emerging from the Horn of Africa conference, Lukas Fiala, a project coordinator at the London School of Economics IDEAS think tank, argued that the conference “provides us with another glimpse into the role of security arrangements in China’s future as a global power,” given China’s recent security agreement with the Solomon Islands and ongoing support of Russia’s war against Ukraine. As Garrett O’Brien reported in The Wire China, these arrangements take the form of “peace with Chinese characteristics”:

Billed as being derived from “diplomatic tradition and wisdom with unique Chinese characteristics,” the [Global Security Initiative] is a six-point plan that reflects Beijing’s long-standing emphasis on national sovereignty, including individual countries’ right to choose their own development paths, as well as its desire to resolve conflicts through “dialogue and consultation.”

[…] Yet this week’s conference has also demonstrated some of the potential inconsistencies in Xi’s blueprint for Chinese diplomacy, in particular its emphasis on non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. Its latest foray into African politics is, in fact, a “formalization and acceleration of China’s active diplomacy or, in this instance, ‘soft interference’ in the domestic politics of others,” says [Seifudein Adem, professor of global studies at Doshisha University in Japan].

[…] “The fact that China was able to host this conference to begin with is already its biggest achievement,” says the Stimson Center’s Yun Sun. “This [was] not a typical peace or conflict mediation conference as we normally would envision. This [was] more of a conference where China gathered the countries of the region to come together and talk about China’s vision.” [Source]

Guled Ahmed, a non-resident scholar at the Washington-based Middle East Institute, said that the conference “serves as an alternative Chinese peace model (addressing only lack of development) to replace Western countries’ conflict resolution approach (focused more on strong intuition and democratisation), which serves well in authoritarian and less democratic countries with bad human rights records.” According to Ovigwe Eguegu, a policy analyst at Development Reimagined, African countries are a prime audience, particularly those that adhere to the principle of “non-interference.” He added that the GSI could provide these nations with an opportunity to hold greater sway in global economics and geopolitics. Redwan Hussein, a national security advisor to the Ethiopian prime minister, framed China’s mission as mere facilitation: “This initiative is owned, directed, managed, and steered by countries of the Horn of Africa, and China has only a supporting role.” 

But an examination of African local media coverage suggests that China intends to play a much greater role, particularly in terms of shaping public opinion about Chinese engagement in Africa. A CDT analysis, described in more detail below, reveals that in the lead-up to the Horn of Africa conference, numerous media outlets from at least two of its African participants, Uganda and Kenya, published a number of attributed and unattributed articles from Chinese state media praising China’s engagement in the region. This tallies with a recent report by the German Marshall Fund titled “China and the Digital Information Stack in the Global South,” which examines how China carries out digital information operations to advance its strategic goals and render the world more hospitable for autocracy. In one case study on Uganda, the authors analyze the rise of content-sharing agreements between Chinese and Ugandan media groups:

Among the most prominent of these has been that between PML Daily, a major Kampala-based news website, and Xinhua News. Such agreements can be mutually beneficial: PML Daily gets unlimited license to republish and distribute Xinhua’s stories, providing more content to readers while reducing the burden on its staff, while China dramatically expands its media penetration in Uganda, allowing it to promote narratives favorable to Chinese interests.

[…] Some information manipulation is much more malevolent, and a major focus of Chinese information manipulation efforts over the past two years has been the global COVID pandemic. Chinese media outlets have pushed back strongly against any suggestion of Chinese responsibility for the pandemic, going as far as to push conspiracy theories blaming American military laboratories. State-backed news agencies, like the China Daily, play up cooperation between China and Uganda on COVID vaccination, using China’s “vaccine diplomacy” to frame China as a responsible world leader, and a partner for Uganda’s government.

Outside the realm of COVID, Chinese news agencies with readership or viewership in Uganda also push support for the regime since it has been a convenient partner for the CCP. This includes stories by CGTN Africa framing [Ugandan President Yoweri] Museveni as a regional leader on economic and political integration. Even more problematically, Chinese news agencies have worked to legitimize Museveni and Uganda’s authoritarian political system through stories that validate his election victory and ignore or downplay allegations of fraud and intimidation. Through content sharing agreements, these stories are seen by many Ugandans on Ugandan news websites with few clear indications they come from Chinese media firms. [Source]

Shortly after the conference, on June 23, Uganda’s Daily Express republished a Xinhua article describing the resolve of Xue Bing, the Chinese Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, to continue supporting countries in the region. (It had also republished two more Xinhua articles the week prior.) On June 22, Ugandan media outlet Red Pepper used a local byline to publish an article that, apart from some light edits, echoed the wording and structure of a previous Xinhua article about the conference. The text of the slightly reworked Red Pepper article reads, “The countries of the region commend China for initiating” the conference, “commit to actively participate in implementing the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative,” and “[express their] gratitude to China for providing COVID-19 vaccines.” And last month, the magazine section of The Monitor’s Uganda edition published a longform article by the Chinese ambassador to Uganda offering fulsome praise for the GSI. 

Other local Ugandan outlets have recently carried Chinese state-media content unrelated to the conference. Among the last 25 China-related articles published since January 1 by Uganda’s The Independent, all but three were republished from Xinhua, and feature headlines such as: “China’s Digital Silk Road solution to corruption in Africa: AU experts,” “How China’s zero-COVID policy works without compromising economic, social development,” and “Xiconomics: Why China’s vision for development can help promote global prosperity.” Last month, Uganda-based East African Businessweek ran an op-ed, written by the director of an economics think tank sponsored by China’s Ministry of Education, that justified China’s zero-COVID policy.

Similar content has appeared in local Kenyan outlets. Five of the last six China-related articles published this month by state-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) were from Chinese state media (the sixth describes a survey about pro-China sentiment in Africa). Just before the Horn of Africa conference, KBC published two articles from CGTN and Xinhua praising China’s Global Development Initiative. One of these articles appeared under the headline “China vows to work with Kenya to defend interests of developing countries.” Another local outlet, Capital News, ran the exact same article. Three of the last nine China-related articles published by Capital News were sourced from CGTN. The Star carried one Xinhua article on the GSI in late April. During the BRICS conference late last week, the homepage of The Nation hosted a Xinhua-sponsored article promoting BRICS efforts to combat climate change. 

Chinese state-media outlets Xinhua and CGTN both maintain regional offices in Kenya, and some local journalists from Kenya and Uganda have attended sponsored training and other exchange programs in China. According to a senior editorial director in Kenya, Xinhua has made inroads in Kenya by developing close links with local journalists and media personnel. DoubleThink Lab’s China Index has also documented other forms of Chinese influence in the Kenyan media landscape, such as local outlets running free content provided by Chinese state media, being partially owned by Chinese entities, or being part of state-media-sponsored networks. While Chinese diplomacy in the Horn of Africa may not succeed in solving the region’s conflicts, China’s state-media influence may help to persuade the public to embrace the Chinese government’s narrative that it is “a force for good” in the region. 

The brutal beating of four young women, after one of the women rejected unwelcome advances from a drunken male diner at a hotpot restaurant in Tangshan, Hebei province, continued to spark outrage on Chinese social media. Tangshan police announced that nine perpetrators—some of whom have criminal records—have since been arrested, but online discussions about gender-based violence, as well as gang activity and police corruption, have continued despite intense censorship.

On Tuesday, Hebei’s provincial public security department released an update stating that the four victims suffered minor injuries. The report largely failed to quell public anger or check the spread of online rumors as netizens shared graphic photos of the women in hospital beds and decried the lack of independent reporting by the press. 

In the wake of accusations about the slow pace of the investigation, lack of public information, and possible collusion or foot-dragging by local law enforcement, Hebei’s provincial discipline commission announced that five local officials in Tangshan are being investigated for “seriously violating discipline and law” in their handling of the attack.  

In addition to fury against the abusers and the Tangshan authorities, some internet users also directed their ire at the bystanders who failed to intervene in the attack. Others cautioned against pointing fingers at regular citizens, given the fact that the law is often not on their side.

In a now-deleted essay archived by CDT, prominent author and social critic Li Chengpeng outlined a series of cases in which citizens attempting to be “good Samaritans” were hit with fines or otherwise punished by the law. The following is a chronological summary of some of the cases that corresponded with contemporaneous press reports:

In 2014, Xiaotu (pseudonym), a resident of Shenzhen, witnessed a sexual assault in progress in a public park and intervened by tackling the rapist, resulting in injuries to the attacker. Xiaotu was detained for 14 days, although the case against him was later dropped by prosecutors.

In the same year, Wu Weiqing, a resident of Guangdong province, aided an elderly man who appeared to have been knocked down in the street. The man then claimed that it was Wu who knocked him over, and demanded that Wu pay his hospital fees. Wu later commited suicide as police were set to investigate him, and the elderly man subsequently recanted his accusation. 

In 2015, a young man surnamed Guo, then a student at a martial arts school in Sichuan, witnessed a sexual assault on a bus and intervened. During the physical altercation that followed, Guo kicked the attacker in the head, resulting in an injury to the man’s brain. Guo was sentenced to two and a half years in prison and ordered to pay over 150,000 yuan (approximately $23,000 U.S. dollars) in damages.

In 2018, Zhao Yu, a 21-year-old man living in Fujian, got into physical altercation with a man outside his apartment building after he heard a woman shouting that she was being raped. Zhao injured the attacker and was detained for 14 days on assault charges, but the case against him was later dropped. He eventually received an award of 30,000 yuan (approximately $4,600 U.S. dollars) from the government for his heroism. 

In 2019, a 17-year-old Henan man, surnamed Wang, got into a fight with another man who was molesting a female friend of his, and broke the molester’s nose. Wang was arrested on assault charges and reportedly expelled from school. The result of the case against him is unclear. 

In 2020, a high-school senior surnamed Hu tackled a man who was molesting his female friend in a shopping mall in Hunan, injuring the molester. Hu was detained on assault charges. The case was later dropped.

The same year, Su Lei, a manager at a supermarket in Yunnan, was detained by police after he apprehended and injured an alleged shoplifter. Su later apologized to the man and paid 66,000 yuan in damages (approximately $9,800 U.S. dollars), a condition set by the police for his release. [Chinese]

Better known to the Chinese public is the controversial 2007 case of a man named Peng Yu. Peng, a resident of Nanjing in Jiangsu province, assisted a fallen elderly woman (Xu Shoulan) by taking her to the hospital. Xu later accused Peng of causing her to fall, and demanded compensation. A judge of the Nanjing District Court, arguing that Peng coming to the woman’s assistance constituted “unreasonable” behavior, ruled in Xu’s favor and ordered Peng to pay her partial damages. The case was later settled through mediation. According to public records, as part of the mediation, Peng admitted to having caused the woman to fall.

More contentious than the details of the case was the court’s reasoning. The court judgment stated that under normal circumstances, no reasonable person would take a stranger to the hospital or pay for their medical bills unless that person were somehow responsible for the injury, a statement that shocked the Chinese public. 

An essay on the WeChat blog 基本常识 (Jiben changshi, Weixin ID: GetCommonSense) also cautioned against blaming bystanders for not intervening:

The real problem is not that no one was willing to step up, but that no one dared to.

In a country as vast as China, it’s likely that the bullying and abuse of women, or fights such as the one in the Tangshan hotpot restaurant, are taking place on a nightly basis, but very few become the focus of public opinion. And in these cases unknown to the public, it stands to reason that there are many bystanders who stepped forward to put a stop to the violence, and may have brought trouble upon themselves or paid the price for it. We know this from years of observation and personal experience living in this society. [Chinese]

A 29-year-old man who claimed to be at the scene when the beating took place recounted his experience in a viral essay published on the WeChat blog 真实故事计划 (zhenshi gushi jihua, Weixin ID: zhenshigushi1). The man admitted to feeling guilty as social media bombarded bystanders for not stepping up to help the victims. However, he stated that after further reflection, he had come to the conclusion that there was little he and other patrons could have done to stop the thugs:

Even as a 29-year-old man in his prime, even assuming that I could summon all the young people at the scene for help, and assuming that they lacked fighting experience, I wouldn’t stand a chance against a group of thugs. Later, I saw many people on the internet accusing us of failing to help or intervene. 

[…] I have to admit that what I could have done was very limited. In the face of extreme violence, anyone would have felt frightened and powerless. [Chinese]

A now-deleted Weibo comment archived by CDT echoed similar sentiments about the potential consequences of intervening as a good Samaritan:

If you were in the Tangshan BBQ restaurant, would you have stepped forward and intervened? The answer is: No. We all have been living in China for so long, let’s not pretend to be [naive] foreign tourists. Stepping forward would have inevitably resulted in a physical altercation with those drunken thugs. As an individual, you wouldn’t stand a chance against a mob of people, much less a mob of violent criminals. You would have ended up in a hospital, or even a morgue. But let’s suppose you’re a great fighter, and that you were somehow able to knock them all out. You would have been arrested by the cops who rushed to the scene, because in their eyes, a brawl is a brawl. You would have ended up paying damages or even going to jail. You may think you’re being a good Samaritan, but in the eyes of the cops, you’re just a troublemaker. [Chinese]

A Beijing-based law firm published an article on the judicial dilemma of how to define the fine line between protecting good Samaritans and indulging vigilantism. The article called for a more liberal interpretation of the “necessity” requirement in determining whether use of violence is justified in a given case. From WeChat blog 北京和昶律师事务所 (Weixin ID: Trusmaticlawfirm):

In order to guard against unrestrained behavior that could lead to the proliferation of vigilantism, which would pose a potential danger to everyone, the law requires that good Samaritans meet the requirement that their intervention was undertaken out of “necessity.” 

In judicial practice, “necessity” is defined very narrowly, and only applies in certain strict circumstances. This leads to situations in which “whoever was killed or injured is in the right” or “whoever makes the biggest fuss is in the right,” thus threatening laypeople’s simple conception of justice.

[…] We urge [the judiciary] to relax the “necessity” requirement in cases of justified defense or self-defense, lest the tragedy of Tangshan be repeated.  [Chinese]

With additional translation by Cindy Carter.